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This paper analyses the effects of non-tariff barriers, in terms of both variable and fixed
export costs, on trade structure. The relationship between fixed and variable trade costs
determines whether international trade emerges. If trade emerges, only variable, but not
fixed export costs, influence the trade structure. The empirical results suggest that non-
tariff barriers act, in particular, as fixed export costs, as the trade and intra-industry trade
emerge in a larger number of industries than prior to the Single European Market
programme, while the share of intra-industry trade is unaffected.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The ‘new’ international trade literature has not been very innovative with regard
to modelling trade barriers, such as transport costs. Almost all contributions focus on
‘iceberg’ transport costs. Recently, the attention of policy makers and international
organisations has shifted to non-tariff barriers (NTBs) as sources of hindrance for
further trade liberalisation and economic integration between countries. These non-tariff
barriers are commonly modelled as a tariff equivalence to ad valorem tariff barriers. In
doing so, it may be possible to capture the quantitative effects of these NTBs, though it
is generally doubtful as to whether such measures can adequately capture the structural
implications on trade and industry. This is due to NTBs consisting of both variable and
fixed trade cost components. Except for Venables (1994), such a distinction is
completely missing in the theoretical literature. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge,
there has been no previous attempt to incorporate both fixed and variable trade costs in
order to analyse the trade structure between countries.
The aim of this is paper is to develop, both theoretically and empirically, the idea
that non-tariff barriers also exhibit fixed cost components. In monopolistic competition
general equilibrium trade models, the differentiated product will always be traded, due
to the love for variety, unless tariff rates or transport costs are infinitely high (e.g.
Helpman & Krugman, 1985). The variable trade costs merely determine the volume of
international trade. This is not only conceptually unsatisfactory, but it also highlights the
virtue of introducing fixed trade costs.
Due to the trade related fixed costs the equilibrium industry structure may
change, rendering exporting infeasible for firms. We know that countries do not trade all
products, and that countries trade more products in a larger number of industries with
some countries than with others. I believe that the incorporation of fixed trade costs
makes a step towards accounting for these stylised facts.
The empirical analysis demonstrates, in using Swedish bilateral trade data with
six EU countries between 1970 and 1994, that the results are consistent with the ideas
forwarded in the theoretical section. In particular, it is demonstrated that countries do
not necessarily trade in all industries, and that intra-industry trade does not emerge in all
industries. This fact is related to difference in relative and absolute factor endowments,
but also to the state and type of economic integration between the trading countries.
Furthermore, the results are consistent with the notion that non-tariff exhibit substantial2
fixed cost components, which have been significantly reduced by the Single European
Market (SEM) programme.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets up the
theoretical model. Section 3 concerns the data and the econometric specification.
Section 4 discusses the empirical results, while section 5 concludes.
II. A MODEL OF MARKET ACCESS
The model, which is in the tradition of Krugman (1981) and Helpman &
Krugman (1985), assumes that there are two countries with two sectors and two factors
of production.
1 Each country consists of one differentiated product industry operating
with increasing returns to scale and one homogenous product industry operating with
constant returns to scale. The industry specific technologies, which are assumed to be
identical to those in the foreign country, are respectively given by
lx ii 11 ,, =+ αβ (1) and lx jj 22 ,, = β  (2)
An individual firm has in total l i 1,  hours of labour available, where α  and β
represent the fixed and marginal cost of production. Assuming full employment  x i 1,
units of output can be produced. The market structure in the former is monopolistic
competition and in the latter perfect competition. In the homogenous product sector
prices equal marginal costs, i.e.
pp w df ,, 222 == β  and PP W df ,, 22 2 == β .  (3)
Due to the assumption of costless trade, it follows that prices and wages in the
homogenous product industry will be the same in both countries.
In the differentiated product industry it is assumed that trade exhibits trade
barriers of the form TB t x f 11 =+ γ , , which include both fixed and variable cost
components. γx f ,1reflects the variable export costs, which depend on the export volume.
γ is a parameter for the distance, while x f ,1 denotes the exported quantity. t can be seen
to reflect the amount of fixed export costs, such as registration fees, market research,
additional costs due to countries adopting different product standards, legislation or
setting up a distribution network. The profit function of a representative domestic firm
in differentiated product industry can be written as
                                                          
1  This is a condensed version of  the theoretical model developed in Mathä (1998).3
() πα β β γ 11 11 1 1 1 1 =+− + + + + px px x t x w dd f f d f ,, ,, , , ( ) . (4)
The subscript d denotes domestic prices and output, while subscript f refers to
prices charged in the foreign country, and output sold in the foreign country.
2  px dd ,, 11  is
the domestic revenue, and  px ff ,, 11  represents the revenue generated in the export
market at export prices.  () αβ + xw d,1 1 is the production cost of the domestically sold
goods in terms of nominal costs. Finally, ( ( ) ) , tx w f ++ βγ 11  is the production cost of
exported goods. Modelling trade barriers in this particular way means that the costs of
exporting have to be borne by the producer. Products to be exported have higher
marginal costs and exhibit a fixed trade cost component. Due to the assumptions of
costless product differentiation and identical input requirements, all firms in the
differentiated product industry will price at the same level. This means that all
domestically produced and all imported varieties will be consumed in respectively equal
quantities.
Individuals in both countries are assumed to have identical consumer
preferences. Furthermore, it is assumed that these preferences are of the Dixit & Stiglitz





















with a constant elasticity of substitution, where consumers like variety as such. x1 and
x2  represent the consumption of the differentiated product and homogenous good
respectively. θ  is a measure of product differentiation. The demand for the homogenous










Following Helpman & Krugman (1985, p. 118), the home (foreign) country demand for








































                                                          
2  The indices referring to individual firms in industry 1 are omitted for convenience, as they are
identical due to the symmetry assumption.  For the wage rate, this subscript can be omitted as wages
are always domestic wages.4
with  σθ =− 11 /( ) and σ > 1. The equations for the respective demand
functions for foreign country produced varieties are similar. σ  represents the elasticity
of substitution between two product pairs in the differentiated product industry. χ is the
share of expenditure spent on goods from the differentiated product industry, while e
and E represent the total expenditure in the respective countries. The notation used
throughout this paper will be such that lower and upper case characters will denote the
home country and foreign country respectively. Thus, home country consumers can
consume n domestic and N foreign varieties.
Profit maximisation with respect to xd,1,x f ,1 , Xd,1 and X , f 1 yield the pricing
conditions in the respective countries  pw d,1 1
1 =
− βθ,  pw f , () 11
1 =+
− βγ θ,  PW d,1 1
1 =
− βθ
and  PW f , () 11
1 =+
− βγ θ.  The mark up over marginal cost is constant, equals
θσ σ
− =−
1 1 /( ), and is identical for both domestic and exported varieties. These can
now be substituted into equations (7) and (8). After some rearrangement, two equations
can be derived, linking the demand for exported varieties from the home (foreign)
























(9) and  X
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In equilibrium output and demand are equal, allowing us to substitute equations (9) and










wW 11 /  yields the
result of
[] πθ τ δθ α β =− + − + () () / ,, , , 1 11 1 1 px X p t dd d d (11)
and   [] Π= − + − +
− () () / ,, , , 1 11
1
11 θτ δ θ α β PX x P t dd d d . (12)
Knowing that free entry assures zero profits in equilibrium, we can equalise equations
(11) and (12) and establish the relationship
xX dd ,, /( ) / ( / ) 11 11 =− − τδ τ δ  (13)
between a home country firm’s domestic output and foreign country firm’s
domestic output. Equation (13) can be substituted back into the profit function to obtain
domestic firms output functions, such as domestically sold output, which is given by
x
t













Equation (14) also determines whether we observe an autarky or a trading
equilibrium, as firms will only choose to export if the can recoup the fixed costs, in
doing so. In autarky n l = 1/( ) σα domestic firms produce  xd, () / 1 1 =− σα β  units of
output. In a trading equilibrium, the number of home country firms equals
nt l =+ 1/( ( ) ) σα , each of which produces xd,1, see equation (14), units of output for
home country individuals.  Separating the trade independent part from the trade












This expression determines how large the fixed export costs as share of the
production fixed costs are can be without rendering exporting infeasible to individual
firms. Exporting becomes infeasible if the export revenue is not sufficient to recoup the
additional export costs. This depends on the variable export costs and on the relative
factor prices, which in turn are determined by the factor endowments of the countries. In
the case of identical countries δ  equals unity, which reduces the export entry condition
to  t /ατ ≤ . Otherwise, it is a priori quite difficult to determine when exactly the
equilibrium ‘flips’ from autarky to trade. This is as δ  is endogenous and solely
determined by the general equilibrium constraint. For example, the effects of increased
trade liberalisation on relative wages may be non-monotonic (e.g. Krugman & Venables,
1990; Amiti 1998). This is particularly the case if countries differ in economic size.
Secondly, the resulting home market effect may be overshadowed by factor endowment
differences.
Hence, we will have to content ourselves with a graphical illustration of the
effects of factor endowments on the export entry condition. As Figure 1 shows, the entry
condition will be affected by the differences in factor endowments and country sizes.
This is due to the endogenous change of factor price differentials between countries, in
order to satisfy the trade balance restriction.
3
If countries are identical with respect to economic size, but different with respect
to their relative factor endowments, the entry condition lies north-westerly of that for
                                                          
3  See appendix for the exact determination of δ .6
identical countries. The reason is that the home country, the net exporter of the
differentiated products, has the relatively lower wage in the differentiated product
industry. As Figure 1 illustrates, the more unequal countries are with respect to their
relative factor endowments, the larger the fixed export costs can be relative to the
























































































Fig. 1. Export entry conditions different factor endowments and country sizes
Hypothesis 1: The larger countries’ differences in their relative factor endowments,
the more likely it is, for given fixed and variable export costs, that
trade occurs (in a specific industry).
If countries differ with respect to their economic size, but are identical with
respect to their relative factor endowments, the entry condition lies south-easterly of that
for identical countries. Here, the reason is that the larger country has the relatively
higher equilibrium wage in the differentiated product industry.
Hypothesis 2: The larger countries’ differences in their absolute factor endowments,
the less likely it is, for given fixed and variable export costs, that trade
occurs (in a specific industry)
In monopolistic competition trade models countries will always trade all
varieties. Trade liberalisation in terms of variable trade costs reductions merely
determines how much trade takes place between countries, unless, at the very extreme,
the variable trade costs are infinitely high. This is, however, conceptually not very
appealing, and we will therefore exclude this extreme case. Thus, the possibility of no
trade solely rests on the interaction between fixed and variable trade cost reductions,
which can be termed improvement in market access.
Increasing rel. factor end. diff.
Increasing abs. factor end. diff.7
Hypothesis 3: Improvements in market access have a positive effect on the number of
industries in which countries trade.
The importance of the fixed export costs should not be underestimated. For
example, if the situation in Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s is adequately
described by declining tariff, but not non-tariff barriers, it is unlikely that the trade
liberalisation process generated trade in new industries. If the SEM succeeds in
dismantling the remaining non-tariff barriers, this will result in improved market access
for third countries, such as Sweden at that time, and is therefore likely to result in trade
in new industries. Additionally, intra-industry trade will emerge in more industries than
has previously been the case.
International Trade Structure
For simplicity, we will assume that the home country is either the larger country
and/or has a comparative advantage in the differentiated product industry. This
assumption ensures that the home country will be the net exporter of the differentiated
product.
4 Under this assumptions then, the trade volume equals two times the home
country exports in the differentiated product industry. This is due to the fact that there is
only one way trade in the homogenous product. Furthermore, as the homogenous
product sector has the mere role of ensuring that trade is balanced, it will not be clear
from the following expressions alone whether countries differ in economic size or not.
Although it is true that the following equations do not distinguish between factor
endowment and country size differences, the wage ratio, which has been endogenously
determined in the trade balance, will typically not be the same. Hence, the shares of
inter- and intra-industry trade will be different. The share of inter- and intra-industry









































The interpretation of these expressions is straightforward though. The share of
inter-industry trade is determined by the differences in factor endowments, and thus
                                                          
4  However, the comparative advantage in the differentiated product industry may lie with the smaller
country. Thus, the larger country may become the net exporter of the homogenous product, despite
having the absolutely larger differentiated product industry. Knowing that the trade balance also
determines which country will become the net exporter of the homogenous product, we can account
for such scenarios in simply adjusting the expressions for the trade volumes in the trade balance, see
appendix. Thus, this restriction does not reduce the generality of the results.8
varieties produced in the differentiated product sector. This includes country size
differences. The share of intra-industry trade is determined by the amount of ‘overlap’
or similarity between the two countries. Again, this includes both relative factor
endowments and country sizes.
Hypothesis 4: Given that trade is feasible, the smaller countries’ differences in their
relative factor endowments, the larger the share of intra-industry
trade in total trade.
Hypothesis 5: Given that trade is feasible, the smaller countries’ differences in their
absolute factor endowments, the larger share of intra-industry trade
in total trade.
Importantly, the reduction the fixed export costs results in a reduction in the
domestic revenue by an amount which is offset by an increase in the number of firms. In
other words, the fixed export costs do not affect the trade structure, but merely whether
countries trade or not. In contrast, variable export costs also determine the structure of
trade.
Hypothesis 6: Given that trade is feasible, variable but not fixed export costs affect
the share of intra-industry trade in total trade.
Combining the hypotheses (1), (2) and (3), see also Figure 1, with hypotheses
(4), (5), and (6), respectively leads to yet another set of testable hypotheses, which do
not appear in traditional monopolistic competition models.
Hypothesis 7: The larger countries’ differences in their relative factor endowments
the less likely it is for given fixed and variable export costs, that intra-
industry trade occurs (in a specific industry).
Hypothesis 8: The larger countries’ differences in their absolute factor endowments
the less likely it is for given fixed and variable export costs, that intra-
industry trade occurs (in a specific industry).
Hypothesis 9: Improvements in market access have a positive effect on the number of
industries, in which intra-industry trade emerges.
III. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
The empirical section aims to analyse the effects of relative factor endowment
and country size differences, as well as the effects of the Single European Market
programme, as opposed to the free trade liberalisation process during the 1970s and
early 1980s. The data covers Swedish bilateral trade with six EU countries in the period9
1970 to 1994. These countries are Belgium/Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy,
Portugal, and the United Kingdom. The data distinguishes 82 industries at the 4-digit
level of the ISIC classification Rev. 2. Thus, this is a longitudinal cross-country
analysis, with a panel of six countries and 25 years.
Dependent Variables
To test whether European integration has resulted in trade and intra-industry
trade in new industries, a straightforward, but as we believe, nevertheless very appealing
measure is constructed. It is simply sum of the number of industries in which no trade is
observed between Sweden and the trade partner k at time t. It is constructed as follows:








































 for  f
.
EXPi,k,t and IMPi,k,t denote the value of exports and imports between Sweden and partner
country k in industry i at time t. Hence, if these two countries trade in all 82 four-digit
manufacturing industries, this measure will be zero.
A similar measure is devised for the emergence of intra-industry trade. It reflects
the number of industries in which no intra-industry trade is observed between Sweden
and partner country k at time t and is constructed as follows:
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.
The Grubel-Lloyd index is used to measure the share of intra-industry trade

























As the Grubel-Lloyd index is bound between 0 and 1 the following logistic
transformation is applied: LIIT IIT IIT =− log( / ( ) 1.10
Econometric Estimation Method
As it happens NTRADE0 is censored at the lower tail. Therefore, estimation of
the dependent variable with Ordinary Least Squares is not appropriate, as the estimated
coefficients are biased. This problem is avoided by specifying a TOBIT estimation,
which accounts for censoring at the lower tail (e.g. Greene, 1993). The estimated model
is as follows:
yß x ii i
* = ′ +µ where  yi
* is the unobserved latent variable,
yy ii =
* if 0 1 << yi
* ,
yi = 0 if yi
* ≤ 0.
The dependent variables NIIT0 and LIIT are not censored. In order to make use
of the panel structure of the data set, a group-specific regression model is used which
allows for:
5
1. groupwise heteroscedasticity, i.e. E it ii () εσ
2 = ,
2. cross group correlation, i.e. Cov it jt ij (,) εε σ = ,
3. within group autocorrelation, i.e. ερ ε µ it i i t it =+ − ,1 .
The different specifications can be estimated as restrictions of the least restrictive
specification. The estimation procedure will be iterated Generalised Least Squares.
6
There are different ways of capturing the similarity in country size. We follow
Helpman (1987) and Hummels & Levinsohn (1993, 1995) who use the similarity index

























It is imminent that this variable captures two effects. The first term captures the
combined size effect of the two trading partners in question, whilst the second term
captures the differences in their relative country size. The proxy is large if countries are
both large and similar in country size. Therefore, we separate the variable SIM into two
                                                          
5  Both fixed and random effects, or indeed a two factor model could have been estimated. Most
commonly, panel data sets involve a large cross-section, while there are only a few time periods. The
data set used in this paper, however, contains a relatively narrow cross-section and a relatively large
number of time periods. As we are interested in explaining both the cross-section and the time series
dimension, the group-specific regression models seems to be the adequate choice.
6  For each specification, nine estimations are computed to test the different restrictions against each
other. Thus, it is not feasible to present all different estimations. The estimation selected for the
presentation is always the least restrictive estimation supported by the data. The full output file is
available upon request.11
independent variables, i.e. LGDPTOT and RELSIZE. These are defined as
LGDPTOT GDP GDP kt kt S W Et ,, , log( ) =+  and RELSIZE e e kt kt S W Et ,, , () =− − 1
22.
The difference in relative factor endowments is proxied by the GDP per capita
ratios, which are calculated from OECD national accounts. The proxy is defined as the
absolute difference in the GDP per capita between country k and Sweden at time t, with




















In order to capture the effects of conventional trade costs such as tariffs, freight
and insurance, as well as unconventional trade costs, such as geographical proximity,
cultural and lingual affinity, we include, LDISTk, the logarithmic transformation of the
geographical distance between Sweden and the trading partner.
During the period 1970-94, a number of changes have occurred in Sweden’s
trading relationship with the countries concerned. In 1973, the free trade agreement
between the EFTA and EC came into force. At the same time the UK joined the EC. In
1986, when Portugal followed suit, the EC prepared for the looming of the Single
European Market. In 1991, Sweden submitted its application for full EU membership.
On 1 January 1994 the EEA agreement between the EFTA countries and the EU came
into force, giving EFTA firms virtually the same access to the Single Market as EU
firms. These changes may have a number of potentially different implications for the
trading relationship between Sweden and these countries. It is virtually impossible to
assess all these changes simultaneously and separately. We restrict ourselves to focus on
two main processes, i.e. the trade liberalisation between EFTA and EC, and the effects
of the SEM programme and its effects on Swedish access to the European market.
Two different time trends are used in the analysis to capture these two different
integration processes. The time trend, TREND, accounts for the general ongoing trade
liberalisation process between Sweden and the EC countries during the 1970s and
1980s. A second time trend, DTREND, is included to analyse whether there is evidence
of a structural break after 1986. If this was the case, this would lend some support to the
argument of the trade liberalisation process between EFTA and the EC being different to
the effects of the SEM.12
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The following figures give an indication of the changes which have occurred in
the last 25 years with regard to the trade structure between Sweden and six EU member
states. These graphs demonstrate that there are significant differences between
countries. There is a general indication of downward trend for NTRADE0 and NIIT0.
Also, it seems that it is more pronounced after the year of 1986. For Germany and the
UK, NTRADE0 is actually zero throughout the period 1970-94, which is in line these
two countries being Sweden’s single most important trading partners. They are among
the larger countries in the EU, and are therefore able to sustain production in a larger
number of industries. For smaller countries, it is likely that industrial production is more












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Trade structure between Sweden and the UK, 1970-94
Econometric Results
Specification (I)
The results demonstrate that the number of industries in which Sweden trades
with its respective trading partners is positively increasing in the similarity index SIM.
Separating the similarity index SIM into the combined country size LGDPTOT, and the
relative country size RELSIZE, reveal that both are significantly negative in explaining
NTRADE0 (Hyp. 2). All coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
The coefficient of LINCDIF is negatively significant at the 1% level (Hyp. 1). If
countries differ with regard to their relative factor endowments, they are likely to
develop their strengths in industries with different factor intensities. Due to this inter-
industry specialisation, these countries tend to trade in a larger number of industries. In
this sense, this result supports one of the core predictions of the factor proportions
theory.
The number of industries in which no trade is recorded is also increasing the
geographic distance between Sweden and its trade partner. The coefficient of LDIST is
negatively significant at the 1% level. This may be the result of cultural and linguistic
affinity, which declines with increasing distance. Distance may also capture other
unconventional trade barriers. As Leamer & Levinsohn (1995) suggested, proximity
may act as a source of comparative advantage.
Lastly, the trade liberalisation process between the EFTA and the EC did not
have any significant effect on NTRADE0, while the Single European Market programme15
seems to have improved the market access. This is in line with non-tariff barriers
consisting of, or acting as, fixed export costs (Hyp. 3).
Table  1:




No. of obs. 150
Threshold value Lower=0, Upper=+infinity
Specification Ia Ib

















T-statistic in brackets. Estimates are
heteroscedastic consistent.
Specifications (II) and (III)
The results in specification (II) show clearly that the larger countries’ similarities
are with regard to their economic size, the larger the number of industries in which IIT
emerges. The coefficients of SIM, LGDPTOT and RELSIZE are negatively significant at
the 1% level (Hyp. 8). The coefficient of LINCDIF is significantly positive at the 5%
level in specification (IIa), but not in specification (IIb). This supports, at least to some
extent that the more similar relative factor endowments between the two trading
partners, the greater the number of industries in which intra-industry trade emerges
(Hyp. 7). This result is, however, not robust across specifications. Nevertheless, together
with the results in specifications (Ia) and (Ib), it can be argued that the factor proportion
explanation cannot be discarded.
The geographic distance is negatively significant in both specifications (IIa) and
(IIb). This may be due to information asymmetries, differences in culture and linguistic
affinity, which may be increasing with distance. Nevertheless, it is still not easily
understood what economic effect this variable actually captures.16
Table 2:
Groupwise Regression Model: Estimates of  NIIT0 and LIIT










Est Technique Iterated GLS Iterated GLS
Dep. Var. NIIT0 LIIT
No. of obs. 144 144
Specification IIa IIb IIIa IIIb
Log likelihood -286.8 -289.5 93.7 94.0
CONSTANT 67.871 178.30 -3.216 -12.934







LINCDIF 4.223 -1.769 -0.012 0.112
(2.121) (-0.546) (-0.046) (0.417)
LDIST 5.105 5.055 -0.813 -0.278
(3.430) (3.701) (-2.877) (-1.132)
TREND -0.042 -0.033 0.007 0.004
(-0.980) (-0.547) (1.354) (0.645)
DTREND -0.093 -0.065 -0.004 -0.003
(-3.282) (-1.866) (-1.438) (-1.090)
Likelihood Ratio Test for Homo-scedasticity χ
2(5)
16.027 11.969
Likelihood Ratio Test for cross group correlation χ
2(15)
26.313 26.081

































Additionally, the results confirm the presence of a structural break in the trend
variable. Again, this result is consistent with the suggestion of the SEM improving the
market access for third countries, and with the suggestion that non-tariff barriers exhibit
a significant share of fixed trade costs (Hyp. 9). Their removal affects generates trade in
new industries and thus in new varieties, something which the trade liberalisation
process in the 1970s, merely aiming to reduce tariff barriers, apparently did not achieve.
Specification (III) reports the results with regard to the share of intra-industry
trade in total trade. The similarity of countries is an important determinant of the share
                                                          
7 A test for the significance of the correlation coefficients can be based on () ( ) ( ) Tr r ii −− ≈ 11 1
222 χ ,
where ri refers to the group specific residual autocorrelation coefficient, and T to the time period.17
of intra-industry trade. The coefficients of SIM,  LGDPTOT and RELSIZE highly
significant (Hyp. 5). Factor endowment differences and geographic distance are,
however, not significant in explaining the share of intra-industry trade. Hence,
hypothesis (4) is not supported. Neither of the two trend variables is significant. This
result supports the idea that the SEM would not affect the share of intra-industry trade,
if the SEM achieved to reduce mainly the fixed trade cost components in the non-tariff
barriers (Hyp. 6).
Summing up, it appears that economic distance, relative factor endowment
differences and non-tariff barriers are important determinants for the emergence of intra-
industry trade, but not for the share of intra-industry trade in total trade.
Sensitivity Analysis
The following tables present the results of the sensitivity analysis carried out in
order to examine whether the results are robust to changes in the starting year for the
interaction term DTREND. The years 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990 were used as
alternative starting years.
It is straightforward to see that the results are very robust. Firstly, the distance,
country size and factor endowment variables are unaffected. Secondly, the significance
of the interaction term DTREND is not affected by the choice of SIM or LGDPTOT and
RELSIZE as explanatory variables. The significance of DTREND is very robust with
regard to different starting years. The significance of DTREND is affected neither in
specification (I) nor in specification (III). In specification (II), DTREND is significant
for most of the starting years.
In contrast, the variable TREND is neither robust across specifications nor across
time. In tables 3 and 4, the coefficient of the TREND is positively significant if the
interaction term DTREND starts in the years 1987 or 1988. This result would have
suggested, had been robust, that the trade liberalisation process during the 1970s and
1980s actually lowered the number of industries, in which trade emerges. This would be
consistent with an even stronger hypothesis than put forward in this paper, namely, that
the trade liberalisation process in the 1970s and the 1980s was accompanied by rising
non-tariff barriers, which resulted in are reduction of trading industries.18
Table  3:




No. of obs. 150
Threshold value Lower=0, Upper=+infinity
Dtrend>0 if  year>= 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Log likelihood -160.4 -158.5 -152.7 -150.5 -154.4
CONSTANT (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) ***
SIM (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) ***
LINCDIF (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) ***
LDIST (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) ***
TREND (+) (+) (+) ** (+) ** (+)
DTREND (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) ***
Sign of coefficients in brackets. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
Table  4:




No. of obs. 150
Threshold value Lower=0, Upper=+infinity
Dtrend>0 if  year>= 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Log likelihood -161.1 -159.3 -153.6 -151.2 -155.0
CONSTANT (+) (+) * (+) ** (+) ** (+) ***
LGDPTOT (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) ***
RELSIZE (-) *** (-) ** (-) ** (-) ** (-) **
LINCDIF (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) ***
LDIST (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) ***
TREND (+) (+) (+) * (+) ** (+)
DTREND (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) ***
Sign of coefficients in brackets. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
Additionally, in specification (IIa), the coefficient of TREND is negatively
significant in all cases except for the starting year 1986. It is not surprising that the
coefficient of TREND significant for later years, as the variable captures part of the
effect of DTREND at earlier starting years. More importantly, though, this result is not19
robust across specifications, as it does not appear in specification (IIb). We summarise
that the econometric results presented in the previous section can be considered robust
to changes in the choice of the starting year of the interaction term DTREND.
Table  5:
Sensitivity Analysis for the Estimates of  NIIT0 and SIM
Specification (IIa)
Est. Technique Groupwise Regression Model
Iterated GLS
Dep. Var. NIIT0
No. of obs. 144
Dtrend>0 if  year>= 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Log likelihood -286.8 -288.5 -287.4 -289.4 -290.6
CONSTANT (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) ***
SIM (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) ***
LINCDIF (-) ** (-) ** (-) * (-) * (-) *
LDIST (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) ***
TREND (-) (-) ** (-) * (-) *** (-) ***
DTREND (-) *** (-) ** (-) *** (-) (-)
Sign of coefficients in brackets. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
Table  6:
Sensitivity Analysis for the Estimates of  NIIT0 and LGDPTOT, RELSIZE
Specification (IIb)
Est. Technique Groupwise Regression Model
Iterated GLS
Dep. Var. NIIT0
No. of obs. 144
Dtrend>0 if  year>= 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Log likelihood -289.5 -290.4 -287.9 -290.1 -291.9
CONSTANT (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) ***
LGDPTOT (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) ***
RELSIZE (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) **
LINCDIF (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
LDIST (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) ***
TREND (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
DTREND (-) * (-) * (-) *** (-) ** (-)
Sign of coefficients in brackets. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.20
Table  7:
Sensitivity Analysis for the Estimates of  LIIT and SIM
Specification (IIIa)
Est. Technique Groupwise Regression Model
Iterated GLS
Dep. Var. LIIT
No. of obs. 144
Dtrend>0 if  year>= 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Log likelihood 93.7 93.0 93.3 92.8 93.1
CONSTANT (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
SIM (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) ***
LINCDIF (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
LDIST (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) ***
TREND (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
DTREND (-) (+) (-) (+) (+)
Sign of coefficients in brackets. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
Table  8:
Sensitivity Analysis for Estimates of  LIIT and LGDPTOT, RELSIZE
Specification (IIIb)
Est. Technique Groupwise Regression Model
Iterated GLS
Dep. Var. LIIT
No. of obs. 144
Dtrend>0 if  year>= 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Log likelihood 94.0 93.3 93.6 93.4 93.8
CONSTANT (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) ***
LGDPTOT (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) ***
RELSIZE (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) ***
LINCDIF (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
LDIST (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** (-) ***
TREND (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
DTREND (-) (+) (-) (+) (+)
Sign of coefficients in brackets. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper analyses the effects of non-tariff barriers on the structure of trade and
industry. It is argued that non-tariff barriers typically include both fixed and variable21
cost components. Due to the introduction of fixed export costs, the industrial structure
might undergo significant changes when trade barriers are reduced beyond a certain
threshold. The equilibrium number of firms changes, and the equilibrium flips from
autarky to trade. Hence, improvements in market access may generate trade in new
industries. This is not possible in solely considering variable trade costs, where all
varieties are always traded and variable trade costs merely determine the volume of
trade.
The econometric results demonstrate, in using bilateral trade data between
Sweden and six EU countries, that countries do not necessarily trade in all industries,
and that intra-industry trade does not emerge in all industries. This is due to differences
in relative and absolute factor endowments, but also due to the state and type of
economic integration between the trading countries. The results suggest that the SEM
has generated trade in new industries, and intra-industry trade in new industries. Such
evidence could not be found for the trade liberalisation process during the 1970s. All in
all, the evidence is consistent with the notion of non-tariff exhibiting substantial fixed
cost components, which have been significantly reduced by the Single European Market
programme and improved market access to the EU.
VI. APPENDIX
In equilibrium, factor income equals expenditure, and the trade balances of both
countries are zero. Furthermore, net exports from the home country have to equal net
imports to the foreign country in the respective industry, and vice versa. We assume
without loss of generality that nN ≥ . The trade balance in the home country is given by
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x2 and c2  refer to home country’s production and consumption of the numéraire,
respectively. Furthermore, we know that the home country’s net imports of the
homogenous good are of equal value to their corresponding net exports from the foreign
country  px c PX C 22 2 2 2 2 ()( ) −= − −. This is the constraint for the trade balance. As

















Selecting  w2 1 =  and substituting (18) into (17) yields the final equation that can be
solved for δ . Having solved for δ ,  w1 can be solved by substituting δ  into (17).




wW 11 / .
VII. REFERENCES
Amiti, M. (1998). Inter Industry Trade in Manufactures: Does Country Size Matter?, Journal of
International Economics, Vol. 44, pp. 231-255.
Dixit, A. and Stiglitz, J. (1977). Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity,
American Economic Review, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 297-308.
Greene, W. (1993). Econometric Analysis, 2
nd edition, (New York. Macmillan)
Helpman, E. (1987). Imperfect Competition and International Trade: Evidence from Fourteen
Industrial Countries, Journal of Japanese and International Economies, Vol. 1, pp.
62-87.
Helpman, E. and Krugman, P. (1985). Market Structure and Foreign Trade: Increasing
Returns, Imperfect Competition, and the International Economy, Cambridge Mass.:
MIT Press.
Hummels, D. and Levinsohn, J. (1993). Product Differentiation as a Source of Comparative
Advantage, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp.
445-449.
Hummels, D. and Levinsohn, J. (1995). Monopolistic Competition and International Trade:
Reconsidering the Evidence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, pp. 799-836.
Krugman, P. (1981). Intraindustry Specialization and the Gains from Trade, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 89, No. 5, pp. 959-973.
Krugman, P. and Venables, Anthony J. (1990). Integration and the Competitiveness of the
Peripheral Industry, pp. 56-75, in Bliss, Christopher and De Macedo, Jorge Braga
(eds.). Unity with Diversity in the European Economy: the Community’s Southern
Frontier, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Leamer, E. and Levinsohn, J. (1995). International Trade Theory: The Evidence, pp. 1339-
1394, in Grossmann, G. and Rogoff, K. (eds.). Handbook of International Economics,
Vol. 3, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers.
Mathä, T. (1998): Factor Endowments, Country Size, and Trade Liberalisation: The Effects on
Structure of Trade and Industry, SSE/EFI Working Paper No. 213, Stockholm School
of Economics, The Economic Research Institute
Venables, A. (1994). Integration and Export Behaviour of Firms - Trade Costs, Trade Volumes
and Welfare, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 130, No. 1, pp. 118-132.